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MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary, National Security Council

SUBJECT : NSC Action 1355

The Technological Capabilities Panel recommendations, which formed the basis for the subject National Security Council Action, have been reviewed by the Central Intelligence Agency in accordance with the responsibilities assigned in paragraph b. of the subject Action. Those recommendations on which the CIA has sole reporting responsibility are discussed in Tab A. Recommendations on which the CIA has primary reporting responsibility, subject to coordination with other agencies, are discussed in Tab B. Recommendations on which primary responsibility was assigned to other agencies, subject to coordination with the CIA, are discussed in Tab C.

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

Attachment:
Copy 1 of TS-140055

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
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Richard M. Bissell, Jr.
Special Assistant to the Director
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or their own, they will sometimes weigh carefully the considerable cost in dollars and manpower against the probability that the CIA will be able to continue to provide for them a large measure of the services which they need.

The use of automatic indexing and sorting equipment and systems such as, for example, well-known IBM systems should also be noted. The adaptability of these and other systems to meet the expanding needs of the intelligence community is a subject of continuing study.

[It is safe to say that both CIA and the (Air Force) are keeping abreast of all new developments in this field which could be of value to intelligence, and that every avenue which may offer promise of improvement will be explored.

add:

A Committee has already been formed containing membership from all Governmental Intelligence Agencies further to explore ways & means of standardizing handling systems

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SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATION C 3

1. This recommendation reads as follows:

We must find ways to increase the number of hard facts upon which our intelligence estimates are based, to provide better strategic warning, to minimize surprise in the kind of attack, and to reduce the danger of gross overestimation or gross underestimation of the threat. To this end, we recommend adoption of a vigorous program for the extensive use, in many intelligence procedures, of the most advanced knowledge in science and technology.

2. Discussion:

The CIA agrees with these statements and recommendations. The Director of Central Intelligence has developed plans for implementation in the near future which will make possible a further step toward the achievement of the objective underlying the TCP recommendation, namely: to "use the ultimate in science and technology to improve our intelligence take."

The Agency has created a permanent Scientific Advisory Board, composed largely of former members of the Technological Capabilities Panel, to advise the Director and to supplement existing activities.

The Agency's plans envisage:

- a. The establishment of a suitable unit, with its supporting laboratory facility, to insure the continual creation, recognition and application of new scientific and technical methods for the acquisition, processing, and production of all forms of foreign intelligence,
- b. The establishment of procedures for developing the concomitant equipment and instrumentation peculiar to the production of intelligence, and
- c. The establishment of close working relationships between the unit mentioned in paragraph a. above, and all correlative developmental divisions within the intelligence community and in particular with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (R&D).

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Specific Recommendation A. 9

1. This recommendation reads as follows:

"As a first step in comparing the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the United States and the USSR in a possible nuclear air war, a comprehensive comparison of U.S. and USSR Bravo, Romeo, and Delta target systems be undertaken in the context of a single symmetric study, using common terms of reference and a common framework of analysis."

2. Discussion:

The CIA concurs in the statement with respect to this recommendation made by the Department of Defense. Upon the establishment of the requirement and the completion of the terms of reference for such a study, the CIA will support this activity within its present personnel allowances and budget.

Specific Recommendation B 12 c.

1. This recommendation reads as follows:

"Sea traffic plots should be established utilizing modern techniques for correlating, analyzing, storing and displaying traffic information gathered from both military and civilian sources. Traffic patterns as well as individual ship movements should be carefully watched."

2. Discussion:

The CIA concurs in the Department of Defense statement on the basis that the plots recommended will provide valuable intelligence on the availability of communist equipment and materials in certain areas for observation or other exploitation.

B 12 c

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The successful launching of the first satellite will undoubtedly be an event comparable to the first successful release of nuclear energy to the world's scientific community, and will undoubtedly receive comparable publicity throughout the world. Public opinion in both neutral and allied states will be centered on the satellite's development. For centuries scientists and laymen have dreamed of exploring outer space. The first successful penetration of space will probably be the small satellite vehicle recommended by the Technical Capabilities Panel. The nation that first accomplishes this feat will gain immeasurable prestige and recognition throughout the world.

The United States' reputation as the scientific and industrial leader of the world has been of immeasurable value in competing against Soviet aims in both neutral and allied states. Since the war the reputation of the United States' scientific community has been sharply challenged by Soviet progress and claims. There is little doubt but that the Soviet Union would like to surpass our scientific and industrial reputation in order to further her influence over neutralist states and to shake the confidence of states allied with the United States. If the Soviet Union's scientists, technicians and industrialists were apparently to surpass the United States and first explore outer space, her propaganda machine would have sensational and convincing evidence of Soviet superiority.

If the United States successfully launches the first satellite, it is most important that this be done with unquestionable peaceful intent. The Soviet Union will undoubtedly attempt to attach hostile motivation to this development in order to cover her own inability to win this race. To

maximize our cold war gain in prestige and to minimize the effectiveness of Soviet accusations, the satellite should be launched in an atmosphere of international good will and common scientific interest. For this reason the CIA strongly concurs in the Department of Defense's suggestion that a civilian agency such as the U.S. National Committee of the NSF supervise its development and that an effort be made to release some of the knowledge to the international scientific community.

The small scientific vehicle is also a necessary step in the development of a larger satellite that could possibly provide early warning information through continuous electronic and photographic surveillance of the USSR. A future satellite that could directly collect intelligence data would be of great interest to the intelligence community.

The Department of Defense has consulted with the Agency, and we are aware of their recommendations, which have our full concurrence and strong support.

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